There has been a lot of speculation the past couple of months on Kimi’s future with his contract with McLaren coming to an end in 2006. The first of the grapevine stalks to really bloom was that he has signed with Ferrari (God forbid). This of course coincided with Michael Schumacher’s contract coming to an end in 2006 as well. With Maranello offering Massa just a single year contract, it really seemed opportunity galore.

 

Then, an Italian (usually on two wheels) started stirring things up a bit. With Rossi testing with Ferrari the whole mix got stirred up again. We now have 4 drivers possibly eyeing a drive in the red sleigh: Shoemaker and Massa with an option on extending their contracts (with Massa’s a little unlikely seeing the company he’s in), Valentino Rossi (but he’s still making up his mind if he wants to switch to two wheels) and of course, the Kimster.

 

Now don’t get me wrong, I would gladly part with a few appendages to keep Kimi with McLaren, but then Ron Dennis signed Alonso and that has possibly left an “off” after taste for Kimi, seeing he’ll be driving alongside his main rival. It may be an awesome thing to see though, two of the best drivers slugging it out in the same machinery. And then the rumor mill broadcast possible links between Kimi and Toyota as well as Renault.

 

So following the proverbial breadcrumbs, I came across the following story which summed it up quite nicely I would say. This is actually the third installment in a series entitled Little Red Raikon Hood: http://www.wheels24.co.za/Wheels24/Columnists/Egmont_Sippel/0,,1369-1857-1990_1908444,00.html.

 

And I <quote>:

So, Kimi was in Cologne last week. That much seems to be fact. What seems less certain, is whether McLaren is really courting Nico Rosberg - or whether Kimi has already got a contract with Ferrari. Why would he be in Cologne, talking to Toyota, if the latter was the case?

 

More to the point: Why would Ferrari sign Raikkonen if Schumacher is apparently eager to race for another two years?

Not that Maranello has suddenly lost interest in the Flying Finn. Everybody knows he's the fastest guy in the world, barring perhaps Chuck Norris or Valentino Rossi.

 

No, just a joke.

 

But as Renault guru Pat Symonds said in the Silver Diamonds Paddock Club enclosure, after Montoya's Monza victory last year: "In Juan's hands, the McLaren is marginally faster than us. But in Raikkonen's hands, it is significantly faster."

 

Ferrari, rest assured, would sell Enzo's tombstone to tie the Kimster down.

 

But they have a problem, and it goes by the name of King Creole.

 

Hey, an Elvis line there?

 

Yes, but so much more: At Maranello, Schumacher lords over Brits, Germans, South Africans, Italians, Japanese and even Indians, in the form of Tata, which supplies Ferrari soft-ware. They all deify the man.

 

But Saint Michael is, in fact, a Ferrari problem.

 

He might still be one of the three best drivers on earth, but a long-term solution he's not.

 

What Maranello needs now is heavy investment in the future.

 

And Michael is blocking it.

 

Which is par for the course, really.

 

In 1995, Schumacher vetoed David Coulthard as a potential Ferrari team mate for1996. And a move to McLaren in 1999 was turned down when it became clear that he would have to race Mika Hakkinen on equal terms.

 

Such an approach leaves no room to go head-to-head with Kimi Raikkonen in a bare-fisted fight.

 

Not at Ferrari. Not anywhere.

 

Kimi, conversely, will not be prepared to play second fiddle as Herbert, Irvine and Barrichello have, and like Massa will have to do pretty soon.

 

Irvine, in fact, out-qualified Schumacher in their first race together.

 

Johnny Herbert was not too far off either, considering that he only did 12 laps in total at Interlagos, prior to 1995 quali - which he tackled in the T-car.

 

This after he had beaten Schumacher's best time in an off-the-line sprint, in his maiden outing in a Benetton.

 

Barrichello also came mightily close in his first run with Ferrari, losing out by 0.027 secs and outqualifying Schumacher in the duo's fourth race together, at Silverstone.

 

Massa also was just 0.047 secs away of achieving this rather remarkable feat, in his virginal run in a 248 F1, in Bahrain earlier this year.

 

Even more remarkable, however, is the way these guys fade, after having run Schumacher so close, initially - although Barrichello always came back strongly over the second half of the season during Michael's championship years, once the title had been sewn up.

 

One could argue that Rubens was always snapping at Michael's heels in Melbourne's season opener, courtesy of the track's point and squirt nature which concertinas drivers together.

 

Easy answer

 

But how does one then explain the Brazilian's performance at Imola in 2002, when he was faster than Schumacher right up to the dying moments of qualifying, before the German commandeered the Brazilian's car to pip him by a mere 0.064 secs.

 

Oh well, these things happen. That's the easy answer.

 

But there's a pattern here, with a really interesting little side show as well.

 

Up to that particular weekend at Imola, see, Barrichello had never driven an F2002 in anger, Schumacher having hogged winter testing of the lone chassis all to himself.

 

Those were the days, remember, when Ferrari never introduced a car at a fly-away event. Imola or Spain, they argued, was much better positioned to deal with the potential teething problems of a new mount.

 

So, Imola it also was, where Michael did a lot of F2002 testing while Rubens had to hang around, performing all other kinds of piffling little duties. Yet out of the box Rubens nearly had the upper hand - which really cannot be said for his efforts this year at Honda, against Jenson Button.

 

The same also goes for Massa, who virtually had to learn his way around the 248 F1's cockpit over the Sakhir GP weekend ?- again after Michael had familiarised himself with the car in pre-season testing, to the exclusion of his team mate.

 

Now, Schumacher is by no means over the hill.

 

Best behind him

 

But it is probably fair to say that he's now at a point where his ultimate best is behind him.

 

He's got a brighter past than future, so to speak.

 

And herein fosters and festers Ferrari's problem.

 

For it's not so much that Michael will be unable to deliver over the next two years (although there are worrying signs that he has been tailing off towards season's end, in 2005 and 2004).

 

No, King Creole will still deliver. By golly, he might even win the title back this year. Or at least carry the flag proudly.

 

But he won't carry it for much longer.

 

Which creates the following dilemma:

 

Ferrari can't refuse Michael if he would like to sign again.

 

Yet, in doing so Ferrari might lose Raikkonen forever.

 

That is to say, if the Kimster gets fed-up by being barred from Maranellian pastures and signs a long-term deal with another team.

 

A matter of choice

 

Let there be no doubt about it, however: The Finn fears the German not. He will go to Ferrari, if that's his chosen team.

 

Schumacher however, will simply not accept Kimi.

 

Not in this life, nor in any other. He'll block him till kingdom come, or until King Creole goes.

 

The recent news then, that Raikkonen has "put pen to paper" for Ferrari - announced a day after it became clear that Schumacher is seeking another two-year term - was easy to dispel.

 

Maranello is not an option for Kimi, simply because Kimi is not an option for Michael. The Schu, after all, is a guy who handpicks his team mates.

 

Try and picture the following then: Michael and Jean Todt bent over a list of names, trying to figure out who Rubens's replacement should be.

 

"What about Raikkonen, Michael?" the Toad asks in all innocence, if such a state of purity is at all possible for him. "He's young, fast, hungry and the future."

 

By golly. After so many years of scouting through the bottom half of the list for a partner, it would have pleased Michael didley squat to stare down the barrel of real speed, real talent and real iron in the soul.

 

Icy soul?

 

Or might it be ice in the soul?

 

It nevertheless begs the question: In what state will he leave Maranello behind?

 

For if no strong driver is recruited over the next two years, if no future champion is nurtured by the existing elite, the post-Schumacher years might be a little bit rudderless and barren.

 

Time will tell, of course. But if Kimi and the Scuderia are serious about each other, there is a way past the Schumacher dilemma.

 

Renault, see, is a force that will not disappear overnight.

 

But they might disappear in two years' time - just at the moment when Ferrari's old age pensioner's patience is due to run out on Michael Schumacher.

 

And voila! Two years in a strong car for Kimi, coinciding with an open door at Maranello once Michael moves on to create a F1 team for VW or Audi, or whatever.

 

Neat, is it not?

 

Focus on the past

 

Indeed - unless Ferrari's present focus on the past rather than the future (i.e. retaining Schumacher at the cost of Raikkonen) forces the Flying Finn's hand onto a long-term contract with, well, McLaren.

 

Or perhaps even Toyota?

 

The latter is unlikely. The world's second biggest car company might be ready for the Ice Man's massive talent in two year's time, but not right now.

 

Which again begs the question: Why then, was he sniffing around Cologne?

 

Briatore certainly wants Raikkonen for Renault - although he has the option of Heikki Kovaleinen as a cheap Kimi imitation to impress cost-minded company boss Carlos Ghosn with.

 

And McLaren's Martin Whitmarsh, so much less inclined to play hard-ball than team principle Ron Dennis, has made no secret of Woking's desire to retain Raikkonen's services - although Dennis, obviously less than impressed by the Finn's flying flirtation with Ferrari, might already have opened discussions with Rosberg.

 

Hey, it might save him $20-million a year, vis-à-vis Raikkonen's salary.

 

Crux of the matter

 

Here's the crux then: the Kimster's ask is stiff indeed. It has to reflect his stature in the game, after all.

 

But if it was only money that mattered, the Ice Man would have signed for McLaren a long time ago, probably on a deal similar to Alonso's.

 

What he's after then, is a title winning car. That's what the waiting is all about, to see which way Michael and Mercedes and McLaren will move.

 

And it's clever, at least on the face of it, to try to eliminate uncertainties and replace them with certainties.

 

The problem with F1, however, is the speed at which the game changes.

 

Somewhere down the line then Raikkonen will have to go out on a limb and make a leap of faith, no matter how well he has researched his options.

 

Racing is simply too fast a game to wait for anybody. If he's not careful, even Kimi might be passed by.

 

A McLaren. A Renault. A Ferrari.

 

And what's left for him, then?

 

Cologne?

 

</quote>

 

The shocking events of the US Grand Prix have led Egmont Sippel to wonder whether one shouldn't rather call F1 something like FIAsco? Or FIArrari? Or perhaps Mafiarrari?

The musician Chris Rea once made a movie called La Passion. It never reached the circuit; it was too long-winded and slow for such a small movie, too soppy and self-indulgent.

But it contained at least one moment of pure genius.

Visually tracing the steps that led to his love for Ferrari, Rea tells the story of his dad watching TV, transfixed, in the days of the shark-nosed car. Pictures were in black-and-white, of course. So the young boy asked about the colour of his dad's favourite machines.

"Red, son," the elder Rea said. "Blood red."

And so they watched the blood red cars flashing by, on black-and-white TV.

On Sunday, a different spectre descended on our beloved sport. Almost half a century after the shark-nosed Ferrari's, we again watched the red cars flashing by, this time on full-colour TV.

Yet it all seemed so black-and-white, so pale and lifeless, so dead.

And it was. F1 had at last succeeded in committing some kind of suicide. This was not a case of shooting itself through the foot; this was a point-blank cracker through the cranium, in front of a worldwide audience.

Except that it all ended with a whimper.

Massive issues

Having struggled for so long to establish the sport as a viable option to Americans -with massive issues at stake for manufacturers such as 'Benz, BMW, Toyota and Honda - F1 was barely emerging from a vicious body blow suffered via the Ferrari debacle of 2002.

And guess who was in the middle of it all again, on Sunday? In the middle of the folly? The farce? The fiasco?

Hey, do you need any more clues as to the sequence of "Fs"?

Blood red the winners might have been. And red the spectators might have seen.

But what it came down to, in the end, was a bleak and desolate F1 landscape; "blood red" without the "red".

Indianapolis 2005 was a bloody affair.

Michelin guilty as well

OK, so the gun was loaded on Friday through Michelin's miscalculations.

Now, a F1 tyre carries more than 220 ingredients. These ingredients are mixed and moulded in terms of various different philosophies pertaining to compound and construction.

In the case of the USA GP, these tyres are then raced along the longest flat-out stretch in Grand Prix racing.

But the dangerous part of the Indy straight is not at the end of 22 seconds of pedal to the metal, but right at the start, where the F1 circuit sweeps out of a purpose-built infield onto the Indy track proper.

For it is here that the cars flash - but briefly - through the only banked section of the season. In 6 000 km of racing this year, this banked curve would total less than 15 km of the distance covered by a car that completes all 19 races.

In other words, the banked section of the Indy circuit amounts to less than 0.25% of 2005's designated race distance.

That 0.25% requires very special attention, though, because it is banked by up to nine degrees, loading the rubber shoulder of the outside tyres - and especially the left rear -with a lot of unique stresses, severely heating the carcass and compound.

Track re-surfaced

For 2005 Indy has been re-surfaced as well. The new top is a rough asphalt with a diamond-shaped cut, the characteristics of which were unknown to Michelin.

Given all of this, one can understand how even a highly advanced techno company can make a mistake in its preparations.

So how come Bridgestone didn't?

Well, they had loads of data from their sister company, Firestone, which had just raced on the re-surfaced top in the Indy 500. That's a serious advantage.

But it still does not explain Michelin's miscalculations.

For here is the nagging question: Why did Depasquier and his men not learn more from last year, when Ralf had a similar blow-out at the same corner -also on Michelins?

And was Alonso's blow-out in the same race - on the same tyres - then really the result of debris?

One wonders.

Tyre wear versus safety

Ralf Schumacher came to the USA this year, hounded by questions of fear and loathing for Indy, bad memories of the place and other such-like trivia which have no place on a racing driver's radar screen.

Or so Ralf thought.

Within a couple of laps on Friday morning the German experienced deja vu when he crashed into a carbon-copy of his 2004 nightmare.

So, here was a pattern: Ralf crashes out at Turn 13 - just like Mark Webber launched a 1999 Mercedes-Benz Le Mans car up into the air, twice in two days, both at the same spot.

Norbert Haug didn't withdraw his cars. Instead, 'Benz fitted extra front fender filler foils, which was supposed to provide 25% more downforce.

And then Peter Dumbreck went airborne in the race itself, flying over trees and miraculously escaping death - after which 'Benz withdrew.

A pattern, then, with Ralf? Or with Toyota, after Zonta had suffered a similar failure on the same tyre, the left rear?

High pressures

Michelin took the responsible option. It investigated and advised teams that it would be safe to qualify with high tyre pressures, but that the company could not guarantee either of the two compounds to last over a race distance.

Clearly, the problem then was safety related. Many people -especially those leaning towards Maranello - now want to typify it as a performance problem, similar to the setbacks suffered by Ferrari at Bahrain and in Barcelona.

It wasn't, though.

In those cases, Ferrari had no other option to fall back onto, no other possible tyre that could be flown in to solve the problems they had, even if they were allowed to.

That's because Ferrari's problem at both these venues was one of tyre wear. Those were the best tyres they had, for those conditions.

And it is wrong, by the way, to allege that Schumacher was retired in Barcelona on safety grounds. If that was the case, all the other Bridgestone runners would have been retired as well.

But none were.

Conundrum

By contrast, Michelin's problem in the USA was one of safety. The solution was to fly another type of tyre in, one that has withstood Barcelona's loads, where the car also leans heavily on the left rear, albeit not on a banked corner.

The FIA's response to this was unequivocal: Not permitted, without inflicting heavy penalties for changing tyres after having qualified on another.

Which is kind of curious, because the FIA also has another regulation in place, in terms of which a tyre can be changed when it is deemed to be unsafe.

The conundrum, however, is that it will be the governing body which decides whether a tyre is, in fact, too unsafe to race on.

When the FIA's F1 Racing Director, Charlie Whiting, thus blatantly disregards clear-cut evidence and expert opinion - as he did in the USA by telling Michelin that its tyre problem is one of performance, and not safety - one starts to understand why McLaren decided not to bring Kimi Raikkonen in for a tyre change at the Nurburgring.

Good heavens, if a flat-out crash of more than 300 km/h against a solid concrete wall does not constitute a safety issue, then a vibrating tyre would be child's play in Charlie's eyes, not so?

Never mind whether the driver can't see, can hardly control the car any more, or is pitched off the track into a barrier, nearly taking another car with him.

Rules and fairness

Charlie, see, was concerned about two issues: 1.breaking the FIA's own rules, and 2. unfairly negating Bridgestone's advantage.

The latter and their teams, he felt, had done a proper job and should enjoy the fruits of their endeavours. And rightfully so; they should.

But when the "Barcelona tyre" solution fell by the wayside, Michelin runners and their supplier came up with a new suggestion to save the race: Put in a chicane to break Turn 13's speed, make it safe for our tyre and as a penalty we will not take any points from the race.

The suggestion was supported by nine teams, as well as Bernie Ecclestone and Tony George, proprietor of the Indy Speedway and promoter of the Grand Prix.

Ferrari conveniently chose not to attend the relevant meeting. When Bernie asked them to support the resolution, they washed their hands of it and deferred the decision to the FIA.

Or, in other words, to Charlie Whiting.

Drinking buddies and altering the track

But here's the rub: Charlie and Ross Brawn are drinking buddies. Deferring the decision to the FIA is, in effect, taking it themselves -because Charlie will do what Ross wants him to do; that's allegedly well known down the pitlane.

Charlie though, has to find reasons for his actions. So he hid behind the book, arguing that it would be against the rules to change the track, blah-blah-blah, well forgetting that race director Roger Lane-Nott erected tyre barriers in Monza's chicanes in 1996 between Saturday morning practice and qualifying, to prevent cars from kerb-hopping.

That's altering the track for reasons of safety.

Or what about Spain 1994, where a tyre chicane had been erected in the middle of the main straight for no other reason than Senna's death, a month earlier, at Imola?

That's altering the track for reasons of safety.

So, putting up a chicane would have been no problem at Indy. It could have been done overnight, on Saturday/Sunday.

Didn't attend meeting

But Ferrari, for reasons only known to itself, declined to attend the meeting at which this solution was discussed - and approved - by nine teams. It was Ferrari also which, for reasons only known to itself, declined to sign when Bernie asked it to. And it is Ferrari who now denies "having been asked about that (issue)".

It is also Ferrari - in the person of Jean Todt - which admits it would not have given permission.

Why not? To protect its tyre advantage?

Surely, the reason one would want to protect this advantage is to score maximum points.

But if the other nine teams decline to take points from the race, Ferrari would have taken all they could have, in any case.

What was there to protect, then?

A-ha, something far bigger. Like image of F1. The sport's responsibility vis-à-vis the public. The well-being of the sponsors. The future of the game in the US.

Ferrari bigger than F1?

If any proof was ever needed then, it is now clearer than ever that Ferrari is no longer the flag bearer of F1.

Under modern management and leadership it has descended into a band of self-centred isolationists, obsessed with its own success which is pursued at any cost.

Todt said it on Sunday: "Honestly, why should we compromise?" For the good of the game, Jean, for the good of the game.

And Schumacher: "I don't know what their problem was, but this was not our problem." Hey, Mickey, it is.

It was F1's problem.

Can't Ferrari and the FIA then ever see beyond their desperate need to make Ferrari win? They had nothing to lose; the Michelin runners had nothing to win.

But Charlie Whiting will come up with a ridiculous suggestion, asking Michelin to ask their teams to ask their drivers to go slowly through Turn 13.

How slowly, Charlie (besides slow enough to let Ferrari win)?

Asking racing drivers "to drive a little bit slower" is in any case like asking a parachute jumper with a highly suspect chute to jump a little bit slower in case it does not open, so he can land safely.

It's as farcical as to suggest that the Michelin teams should pit every 10 laps for new tyres, to side-step a disastrous calamity.

So what if a tyre blows on a driver's ninth lap, Charlie? And he is killed?

Should the technicians have informed him to pit after eight laps?

But how could they have known?

Jean is so funny (and sharp)

Jean Todt said a funny thing on Sunday. He said Ferrari would not have agreed to a chicane which "they have not had a chance to test".

But Ferrari was willing to take the F2005 to Bahrain, without the car having been tested properly.

Charlie Whiting said an equally funny - or is it sad? - thing: "If the Michelin teams had used the new (Barcelona spec tyre, which was flown in), they would not have been excluded, but rather punished heavily enough not to do it again."

And how heavy is that, Charlie?

Nobody knows. Just like McLaren didn't know whether it would have been punished if it had changed Raikkonen's tyre at the 'Ring. If so, how heavy would the punishment have been?

And this is the tragic irony of it all. Whiting says that they can't just change the rules willy-nilly to suit certain teams at certain times.

Nobody asked for that, Charlie. These were desperate times borne out of a very very serious safety issue.

And you and Max Mosley had the power to find a solution for it.

But you declined. You refused, in fact. Because every single decision you take, you take in the interest, not of F1, but of Ferrari.

The funny thing is that the punishment that would have been dished out to transgressors is such a secret to all of F1 -which shows that you indeed make up rules and regulations, willy-nilly, as you go along.

Rules that normally happen to suit Maranello as well - such as banning berillium in engines in the late '90s, just because McLaren had the jump on Ferrari. And banning McLaren's mechanically operated brake system, just because it had the jump on Ferrari. And pardoning Ferrari's gross barge board transgression in '99, just because it is Ferrari. Etcetera. Etcetera. Etcetera.

Fly off

I mean, here is an organisation that controls a multi-billion sport, but reverts to a discredited qualifying system six races after it was discarded! How's that for leadership?

So, in all honesty, can we expect this bunch of kindergarten buffoons to rise above their petty personal little infantile interests, climb out of the sandpit, let sanity prevail and take good solid decisions to save F1 from the disgraceful madness we witnessed on Sunday?

Michelin had admitted its mistake. It had no means of rectifying it. Its customers were magnanimous enough to forsake a quest for world championship points. An inelegant solution was put on the table, but a workable one, nonetheless.

It might be ridiculous to race with a make-shift chicane.

But it has been done before. And would fans still have thrown full beer cans at cars flying down the straight?

No. Which tells us that it is even more ridiculous to race with six cars only.

Yet the FIA and Ferrari told the rest - including the spectating public - to fly off, they were unconcerned with the problem; it wasn't theirs.

It might not be, in the near future. F1 is on the ropes. A split is looming. The sooner it comes, the better.

In fact, F1 as we know it deserves to die. What else can you say about a sport that carries a gun onto the grid, points it at itself and pulls the trigger?

And we thought the Yanks were gun crazy!

After my previous effort I write this entry with a (very) lighter mood. The Canadian Grand Prix is over and the Iceman is still in the running for the World Championship after taking the top step on the podium on Isle de Notre Dame. Admittedly, with some help from Lady Luck who has been eluding him on a couple of occasions. With the Champion’s Wall as the culprit, Kimi’s main title rival failed to finish the race which narrowed the gap in the world championship to 22 points. Still a big gap, but it is possible to close in and overtake Alonso. Especially since Alonso will have to run his qualifying stint for Sunday’s race in Indy very early in the session.

It was not all joy and happiness though as Button’s crash saw Montoya pit and re-enter the race while the safety car was out, effectively giving Kimi 1st place and then getting black flagged for ignoring a red light in the pit lane. This cost McLaren their first 1-2 since the days Mikka Hakkinen et al bulldozed the opposition a la Ferrari in (vague) recollection.  It was however a sign that F1’s Fezz is on his way up again and helping Team McLaren Mercedes to have a sporting chance in the Constructors Championship. Something that they couldn’t do when DC was doing his Sunday drives on the F1 track. Ok, so the races were on Sundays. But still.

I second the comments on Olaf’s blog (http://spaces.msn.com/members/olafwagner/Blog/cns!1pNd-1CG6zLHR7byWynaufkA!151.entry?owner=1). Hopefully the luck will be on Kimi and McLaren-Mercedes' side. Personally I feel Kimi R is the driver with the worst luck this season. Lest reflect on some of these "unfortunate events".

 

1. Albert Park - Qualifying low as result of a downpour late in first qualifying. Finishes 8th from tenth on the grid

2. Sepang - Finishes 9th after tire failure while running third

3. San Marino - Car breaks down while running in a VERY strong 1st

4. Nurburg - Front right wheel breaks off with less than a lap to go, again whilst in the lead

 

Now, the comments may sound like a teary whine, but I must admit, the Nurburg ring failure was caused by human error. Tires only get flat-spotted when the driver locks up his brakes. And Kimi was under the impression that Nick was catching up thus pushing a little too hard at times. Even though Nick was catching up, the team management should have known that the BMW was running low on fuel and would have to make another pit stop, 3 in all versus McLaren’s 2 stops.

 

 But all in all I feel that Kimi is the driver on the grid that’s got the most drive to win. The hungriest to get on the top step of the podium. Let’s hope lady luck (and his awesome driving) gets him where he deserves come Sunday 15:00 GMT – 6.

 

Go Iceman...